Results are presented from an experiment using quantum key distribution with decoy states and lownoise superconducting nanowire single photon detectors to distribute secure key across 145 km of optical fiber.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution [2] provides a method for users to communicate securely, where the security of the transmission relies on quantum mechanics rather than difficult-to-prove assumptions about the difficulty of performing certain computational tasks. In the idealized two-user BB84 [3] "prepare-and-measure" protocol, the sender (Alice) encodes bit and basis information in the quantum state of a single photon and sends it to the receiver (Bob), who decodes the information by measuring the photon in one of two bases. When Bob measures in the same basis that Alice used, he can determine which quantum state Alice sent, but, provided the information is encoded on a single photon, an eavesdropper trying to learn the bit value will introduce disturbances that Alice and Bob can detect. After the photons are sent and received, Alice and Bob remove any errors by performing error correction, and they privacy amplify the bits to remove any information an eavesdropper could have obtained.
Because single photon sources are not readily or commercially available, practical systems use a laser source attenuated so that the mean photon number per pulse is much less than one. In this case, most of the non-empty pulses of light contain only a single photon, but the presence of even a small number of multi-photon pulses opens the door to the possibility of a photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [4] . In a PNS attack, an eavesdropper (Eve) modifies the channel transmittance to make the channel more opaque to single photons and more transparent to multi-photons. If the fraction of multi-photons is high enough, she can make the channel completely opaque to single photons and gain full information about the resulting key that would be composed of photons that originated from multi-photon pulses at Alice. To protect against such an attack on a BB84 system using a weak laser source, it is necessary to either use a very low mean photon number, which severely limits the length and bit rate of a QKD system, or to modify the protocol by introducing decoy states [5] . In a decoy state protocol, Alice sends at two or more mean photon numbers, and knowledge of the number of detections at each level allows the users to place a bound on the single photon transmittance that can then be incorporated in the privacy amplification step. 
Experimental setup
For this work, we used the phase-encoding fiber quantum key distribution system shown in Figure 1 . Pulses from a gain-switched distributed feedback (DFB) laser operating at 1550 nm traveled through an electro-optic amplitude modulator that was used to provide the needed mean photon number μ for each light pulse. Alice's phase encoder split the wavepacket from a 1550 nm laser into an early and a delayed component, and a phase modulator was used to randomly apply one of the four BB84 phases to the delayed part of the wavepacket. The light then traveled across a 151 km length of optical fiber to Bob's phase decoder, where a phase modulator modulated the delayed part of the wavepacket, and photons were detected by two superconducting nanowire single photon detectors (SSPDs). Tuning of the interferometer was accomplished by adjusting a motor-driven air-gap, and synchronization between Alice and Bob was performed using a remote clock recovery technique [6] . The tuning and synchronization were all done automatically, enabling long-term independent system operation.
The superconducting single photon detectors (SSPDs) consisted of 100 nm wide niobium-nitride nanowires patterned into a 10 μm by 10 μm square and cooled to 3 degrees Kelvin [7] . The detectors were biased close to the critical current so that a photon absorbed in the nanowire meander would create a hot spot and therefore a voltage pulse. The dynamics underlying the hot spot formation are very fast, resulting in timing resolutions of ~70 ps for the detectors used. The detection efficiencies of both SSPDs were matched by adjusting the bias currents, yielding fiber-coupled system efficiencies of 0.5% and total dark count rates of ~80 counts per second in both detectors.
Results and discussion
We implemented a three-level decoy state protocol, consisting of a moderate μ used to create sifted bits, a low μ, and a μ as close to vacuum as possible. Before data was collected, simulations were performed based on the interferometer visibility and detector dark count rates to determine the optimal experimental parameters. For a fiber link of 135 km, the optimal moderate and low mean photon numbers were determined to be 0.57 and 0.14. The near-vacuum mean photon number was limited by the experimentally determined 24 dB extinction ratio of the switch, giving μ = 0.0023. Sending probabilities for the moderate μ, low μ, and vacuum states were 70%, 20%, and 10%, respectively. Although all the data were collected at 151 km, shorter distances were realized by redefining the system so that part of the fiber link was contained within Alice's enclave.
Error correction of the sifted bits was performed using the modified CASCADE protocol [8] , and the bits were made secret using GLLP privacy amplification [9] incorporating the bounds determined from the decoy state protocol. In addition to calculating an upper bound for the single photon transmittance, we also found a lower bound on the single photon error rate, rather than making the worst case assumption that all errors occur on single photons. As shown in Figure 2 , the rate of secret bits calculated under these assumptions goes to zero at 145 km of optical fiber with a total loss of 29.9 dB. 
Conclusions
The low dark count rate and excellent timing resolution of the SSPDs enabled creation of secret bits using a BB84 decoy state protocol over a 145 km link of optical fiber, the longest length to date for such a system. Unlike avalanche photo-diodes, the SSPDs did not need to be gated, removing susceptibility to a timing attack that exploits detector efficiency mismatch [10] and simplifying their integration in a QKD system. Although these detectors had low detection efficiency, SSPDs have been constructed with high intrinsic detection efficiency [11] , and reductions in coupling losses can result in detectors with much higher system efficiency. Use of these high efficiency detectors for QKD would not only increase the secret bit rate at a given distance but also extend the maximum distance over which secret bits can be created.
